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I.  Introduction
Two basic means of stimulating innovative activity are compared in this paper.  One is a
system of rewards paid by the government to innovators.  According to this system, innovations
would pass immediately into the public domain, becoming freely available to all.  The other
approach is the familiar system of intellectual property rights that we employ, notably, patent and
copyright protection, under which the government confers to innovators exclusive rights to
market the goods and services that embody their intellectual works. 
Our main conclusion is that the intellectual property rights system does not enjoy any
fundamental advantage over the reward system.  Indeed, an optional reward system — under
which an innovator can choose between a reward and intellectual property rights —  is superior to
the intellectual property rights system in the model we examine.  These findings derive from the
primary virtues of reward systems: that incentives to innovate are provided without granting
innovators monopoly power over price; and that the magnitude of research incentives may be
selected by government.  A principal difficulty with reward systems, however, concerns the
government’s need for information to calculate rewards (although the government might be able1On the history of patent, see Dutton (1984), Machlup (1958), MacLeod (1988), and, especially, Prager (1944).  
For an account of the 19
th century European debate about patent, see Machlup and Penrose (1950); and see also Chapter 1
of Dutton (focusing on Britain in the 19
th century) and Chapter 10 of  MacLeod (focusing on Britain in the 18
th century). 
For materials relating to the patent debate, see Macfie (1869, 1875, 1883).
2Another criticism was that innovators did not actually receive much of the profits from patents because
businesses to which they sold their rights made the lion’s share; thus, it was argued, patents did not really provide a strong
motive to innovate.  A quite different criticism was that patents were not needed to induce innovators: on one hand, they
could often earn enough to induce innovation merely by being first to market; on the other, they often were motivated by
fame and honor, so financial incentives were not necessary.  On the criticisms made of patent, see Macfie (1869, 1883) and
Machlup and Penrose (1950). 
3See Macfie (1883 p. 141) and Machlup and Penrose (1950 p. 4).
4See MacLeod (1988 pp. 191- 96), who notes that at least eight acts authorizing rewards for specific inventions
were passed by Parliament between 1750 and 1825, that substantial sums were granted by Parliament to specific inventors
(such as £30,000 to Edward Jenner for his smallpox vaccine), and that many organizations (especially industry groups)
instituted reward schemes.
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to base rewards on sales volume).
   To motivate our analysis, we first mention a significant historical episode about the patent
system and rewards.  Although a fairly well-developed patent system had emerged as early as the
1400's in Venice and had spread through much of Europe and the New World by the end of the
18
th century, the system came under strong attack in the next century, especially during the period
1850 - 1875.
1  Criticism of the patent system reflected dislike of monopoly power, both because it
harms consumers who have to pay high prices and because it can hinder improvements and
subsequent innovations if patent holders disallow that.
2  Many economists disapproved the patent
system, and in some countries, such as Germany, the economics profession was virtually
unanimous in its opposition to patent.
3  
Reward systems were widely discussed as an alternative method of spurring innovation
(and they had been used to a not inconsiderable extent
4).  For example, Robert Macfie, a member
of Parliament in England and an influential champion of  rewards, set out a proposal for a
government-financed reward system to replace patent, the London Economist pressed for5Macfie’s proposal is reproduced in Macfie (1869 pp. 84-87).  Machlup and Penrose (1950 p. 19) describe the
attention given to rewards by the Economist and state that reward proposals “were discussed in the professional journals
and conferences almost everywhere.”
6Mill (1872 p. 563).
7See Machlup and Penrose (1950 pp. 3 - 6).  They suggest that the victory of patent was associated with the
weakening of the free-trade movement (which was occasioned by the economic depression of the 1870s), as the free-trade
movement was closely linked politically to the anti-patent forces.
8For a description of, and materials on, intellectual property rights protection, see, for example, Goldstein (1993).
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adoption of a reward system, and economists examined rewards in professional journals, books,
pamphlets, and conferences.
5  Opinion was, however, divided on the virtues of rewards (criticism
of patents did not imply endorsement of rewards).  The chief argument against rewards concerned
difficulties in their administration; it was typically expressed by John Stuart Mill, who maintained
that patent is preferable “because it [patent] leaves nothing to anyone’s discretion; because the
reward conferred by it depends upon the invention’s being found useful, and the greater the
usefulness, the greater the reward...”
6
As a consequence of the criticism of patent, and also of the possible utility of rewards as
an alternative, many countries in Europe prepared to reform or abolish patent, and some actually
did so: England established a series of royal commissions from the 1850's to the 1870's to
investigate the patent system; Chancellor Bismarck recommended abolition of patent in Prussia in
1868; Holland repealed its patent system in 1869; Switzerland, which had no patent law, rejected
legislation to adopt it in 1863.  Nevertheless, Europe ultimately embraced patent, but for reasons
that may perhaps be regarded as more politically accidental than indicative of a substantive policy
judgment favoring that system.
7  
In any case, today, intellectual property rights provide the principal legal financial stimulus
for innovation.
8  Rewards are little employed; their payment appears to be limited to inventions in11For example, as Kremer (1997) notes, the French government purchased the patent for the Daguerrotype in
1839.  In 1851, a proposal was made in the English Parliament for government to purchase patents routinely;  see Macfie
(1883 p. 33).
12Her main result is that direct revelation mechanisms are equivalent to patent renewal systems — systems in
which patentees are able to extend the length of their patents by paying fees (or accepting reduced patent subsidies) for
renewals.  Such systems have the feature that they implicitly make use of innovators’ private information; notably,
innovators with more valuable patents will  be the ones who will tend to purchase longer patent extensions.  In Scotchmer
(1998), a revision of her paper, she notes the results on rewards that we demonstrated in an earlier version of this paper,
and she solves in certain cases for optimal renewal schemes which incorporate rewards.
13However, as we will note, we consider a version of the model in which the government observes quantity sold in
the market and makes inferences from that in formulating rewards.  As this is the most plausible form of reward system, it
is very important for properly interpreting the analysis here to bear it in mind.  For further discussion of this issue, see
Section IIH and Section III. 
14The chief contributions of our paper are (a) that it clarifies the comparison between patent and reward through




11)   Another paper of significance is Scotchmer (1997); although she
does not emphasize rewards, she characterizes the optimal form of patent system assuming that
innovators possess superior information to the government.
12
In this paper, we examine a model in which a single potential innovator knows the demand
curve for the product innovation he might produce before he invests in research, whereas the
government knows only the probability distribution of demand curves.
13  We first compare the
patent system (for concreteness, we refer to patent rather than to intellectual property rights in
general) to the reward system.
14
Under the patent system, the innovator’s incentive to invest in research is the monopoly
profits he would earn, and if he produces the innovation, he then sells the innovation at the
monopoly price.  There are two familiar deviations from first-best behavior under the patent
system.  First, incentives to invest in research are inadequate, because monopoly profits are less17Note, however, that when the reward is conditioned on quantity sold, reward will reflect surplus to the degree
that quantity sold does.
18Such a system was proposed by Polanvyi (1943).  Note too that a system in which the government offers to buy
patents is of this type.
7
invest is not linked to actual surplus but only to the reward.
17  In particular, if the innovation
would be very valuable, the innovator would invest only in accordance with the reward, which
will equal the expected surplus from all possible innovations.  
Because patent effectively harnesses the private information of the innovator about the
value of an innovation, incentives to innovate might be superior under patent to those under
reward, even though the incentives under patent are always less than first-best.  This leads to the
possibility that patent could be superior to reward, despite the deadweight loss due to monopoly
pricing and the too-small incentive to innovate.  Reward, however, could be superior to patent,
both because of a better average incentive to innovate (as the optimal reward equals expected
surplus) and because of avoidance of the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.  Analysis of
patent versus reward does not lead one to think that there exists any general argument favoring
the patent system over the reward system. 
We next consider the optional reward system, under which an innovator may choose
between a patent and a reward.
18 This system unambiguously dominates patent.  The main reason
is that we show that (expected) social welfare can be improved when the innovator chooses
reward, for deadweight loss is then eliminated, and potential problems with overinvestment in
research can be addressed by the government’s selecting an appropriately moderate level of
reward.  Because social welfare is improved relative to patent when the innovator chooses
reward, the optional system must be superior to patent, since there is obviously no difference20Thus, we are implicitly supposing that the government’s information is good enough to screen out innovations
with no value (or with no expected value).  This assumption makes sense if the government devotes positive resources to
screening innovations, and it is also justified if the government obtains information from sales of innovations, as discussed
in Section IIH and Section III.
21The assumption that the innovator has perfect information about demand (since he knows t) and that the
government does not is the simplest way to reflect the idea that the innovator possesses superior information about
demand.  A more realistic assumption is that the innovator’s information about demand is not perfect but still is better than
the government’s, and were this the assumption, it will be obvious that the qualitative nature of our results would not be
altered.
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c  =     unit cost of the innovation product.
Regarding the demand curve for the product, let
q =    quantity of the product;
d(q;t)   =    (inverse) demand curve for the product; dq(q;t) < 0; 
where 
t  =     parameter in [ta, tb];
g(t)  =     probability density of t; g(t) > 0 on [ta, tb].
We assume that at ta, monopoly profits, deadweight losses from monopoly pricing, and social
surplus (these are described below) are positive,
20 and that they increase with t.  
  We suppose that the function p(k), the cost c, the family of possible demand curves d(q;t),
and the density g(t) are common knowledge for the innovator and the government.  The innovator
alone knows t.
21  Also, we suppose until later that the government does not observe quantity sold. 
(In Section IIH we allow the government to observe quantity and to base the reward on this.) 
Social welfare is assumed to be the expected value of the utility individuals obtain from the
innovation product, minus production costs, and minus research investment.  
A.  First-best Outcome
If there is an innovation, the first-best quantity, denoted q(t), is such that the height of the22That is, k(z) is determined by pN(k)z = 1.  Note that k(z) is increasing in z (implicitly differentiate pN(k)z = 1
with respect to z to obtain kN(z) = -pN(k)/(zpO(k)) > 0). 
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demand curve is c, that is, d(q(t),t) = c.  Thus social welfare exclusive of research investment is
the social surplus,
                        q(t)
s*(t) =  I(d(q;t) - c)dq. (1)
                        0
Consequently, the first-best research investment is that which maximizes
p(k)s*(t) - k, (2)
so that
pN(k)s*(t) = 1 (3)
identifies the first-best k.  If k(z) denotes the k that would be chosen if z is the payoff from an
innovation,
22 then the first-best k is written k(s*(t)).  First-best social welfare as a function of t  is
thus 
W*(t) = p(k(s*(t))s*(t) - k(s*(t)).  (4)
Figure 1 shows s*(t) and k(s*(t)).
B.  Patent Regime
Under the patent regime (exemplifying intellectual property rights) the innovator has the
exclusive right to sell the product resulting from an innovation.  Hence, if he innovates, he will sell
the monopoly quantity and earn monopoly profits.  Specifically, let
qm(t)    =  monopoly quantity, and
B(t)     =  monopoly profits.
Knowing that an innovation would yield B(t), the innovator will choose k to maximize23See, for example, Chapter 10 of Tirole (1988).
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p(k)B(t) - k (5)
so will choose k(B(t)).    
Let us compare the outcome under patent to the first-best outcome.  Now, as is familiar,
qm(t) <  q(t), so that the social surplus under patent falls short of first-best social surplus s*(t) by
the deadweight loss 
             q(t)
l(t)  =    I(d(q;t) - c)dq. (6)
             qm(t)
Hence, social welfare under the patent regime given t is
WP(t) = p(k(B(t)))[(s*(t) - l(t)] - k(B(t)). (7)
This may be compared to first-best social welfare given t:
  W*(t) - WP(t) = {[p(k(s*(t)))s*(t) - k(s*(t))] - [p(k(B(t)))s*(t) - k(B(t))]} + p(k(B(t)))l(t). (8)
The first term, in braces, is clearly positive, and represents the welfare loss from inadequate
investment in research under monopoly: because the monopolist’s profit B(t) is less than first-best
social surplus s*(t), he underinvests in research, k(B(t)) < k(s*(t)).  The graph of k(B(t)) is shown
in Figure 1.  The second term is the expected deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing.   In
summary, we have
PROPOSITION 1: Under the patent system, there are two sources of welfare loss relative to
first-best welfare: insufficient investment in research; and insufficient quantity of the innovation
product sold, with accompanying deadweight loss, due to monopoly pricing. 
These points are, of course, standard;
23 they are set out so that we can contrast patent to
reward.12
C.  Reward Regime
Under the reward regime, the government gives a reward to the innovator if he succeeds
with an innovation, and it is assumed that the innovation information is placed in the public
domain and made available to a competitive production industry.  Hence, it is assumed that the
product will be sold at a price of c, so that zero profits will be made from production and total
quantity produced will be q(t).  Let 
r    =   reward paid by government for an innovation.
The innovator’s incentive to innovate is due entirely to the reward, since he makes no profits from
sales.  He will thus choose research investment to maximize
p(k)r - k, (9)
so will choose k(r).  
It follows that if — contrary to our assumption —  the government were to possess 
perfect information about the demand curve t, the government could achieve a first-best outcome
for each t by setting the reward r equal to s*(t): the innovator would then choose k(s*(t)), the
first-best investment in research; and the quantity produced is always optimal, q(t), under the
reward system.
Because our assumption is that the government does not know t (and does not observe
quantity sold), the reward r must be fixed and independent of t.  Social welfare as a function of
the reward is
        tb
 WR(r) =    Ip(k(r))s*(t)g(t)dt - k(r) = p(k(r))E(s*) - k(r), (10)
        ta
where E(s*) is the expected value of s*(t); see Figure 1.  It follows that (10) is maximized if r =24Specifically, p(k)E(s*(t)) - k is maximized over k if k = k(E(s*(t)), so r must equal E(s*(t)).
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E(s*).
24  That is, the optimal reward r* is the expected social surplus from an innovation.
We can now compare social welfare under the reward system to first-best social welfare.
The difference beween the two is that research investment is the constant k(E(s*)) under the
reward system, whereas investment depends optimally on t, equals k(s*(t)), in the first-best
situation.  Under the reward system, research investment k(E(s*)) is excessive relative to the first-
best when s*(t) is below E(s*) and is inadequate when s*(t) exceeds E(s*).  
To summarize this section,
PROPOSITION 2: Under the reward system, the optimal reward r* equals the expected
value of social surplus, E(s*), from an innovation.  There is one source of welfare loss relative to
first-best welfare: incorrect investment in research, which will be excessive or inadequate
depending on whether actual surplus falls below or exceeds E(s*).  There is no deadweight loss
due to monopoly pricing if there is an innovation.
Note that the information the government requires to calculate the optimal reward is the
density g(t) of the family of demand curves d(q;t) and the production cost c (in order to compute
the surplus for each demand curve).  The government does not need to know the probability
function p(k).
D.  Patent versus Reward
If we subtract social welfare under patent from that under reward, we obtain
                                                          tb
           WR(r) - WP  =  WR(r)  - IWP(t)g(t)dt 
    ta14
                     tb
         =    I{[p(k(E(s*)))s*(t) - k(E(s*))] - [p(k(B(t)))(s*(t) - l(t)) - k(B(t))]}g(t)dt. (11)
                           ta
The integrand in the second line reflects the two differences between reward and patent that we
noted in the Introduction.  First, under reward, there is no deadweight loss from insufficient
production, whereas there is under patent.  This constitutes an advantage of the reward system
and tends to make the integrand positive (note that l(t) is subtracted from s*(t) in the second
term).  Second, under reward, the research investment is a constant k(E(s*)), whereas under the
patent, research investment depends on t, and equals k(B(t)).  This difference may favor either
patent or reward: when s*(t) is sufficiently close to its mean, E(s*), investment will be closer to
its first-best level under reward than under patent, where it is inadequate for all t; nevertheless,
when s*(t) is very different from E(s*), investment may be closer to first-best under patent than
under reward.  
Figure 1 helps to clarify the comparison.  Let t* be the t such that s*(t) = E(s*(t)).   As
shown in the Figure, reward is superior to patent for t in a region around t*.   For t sufficiently
close to t* and within this region, reward is superior to patent for the double reason that
investment is closer to first-best than under patent and deadweight monopoly pricing loss is
eliminated; elsewhere in the region, reward is superior to patent even though investment is farther
from first-best than under patent, because reward eliminates monopoly pricing deadweight loss. 
For t outside the region, patent is superior to reward because investment is sufficiently closer to
first-best under patent than under reward as to overcome the deadweight loss due to monopoly
pricing.  This makes it clear that if enough probability mass is distributed close to t*, reward will
be superior to patent, whereas if enough mass is not close to t*,  patent will be superior to25We have also constructed numerical examples (see the Appendix) in which patent is superior to reward and in
which reward is superior to patent.
26This follows from continuity considerations and the fact that at t*, the integrand is positive, for at t*,




25  Hence, we have
PROPOSITION 3:  Either the reward system or the patent system may be superior to the
other.
The foregoing discussion also leads to two observations about the comparison between
reward and patent.
First, if the information that government has about demand is sufficiently good, then the
reward system will dominate patent.  Specifically, if the probability mass is sufficiently
concentrated about E(s*), it follows from (11) that reward will dominate patent.
26  This is because
the research investment under reward will tend to be superior to (and higher than) that under
patent and deadweight loss from monopoly pricing will be avoided.
Second, if the need for well-calibrated incentives to invest in research is sufficiently
attenuated, then the reward system will dominate patent, because the factor of the elimination of
deadweight loss from monopoly pricing will be of dominating importance.   One way to make this
notion precise is to consider the family of research investment functions p(k8), where 8 is a
positive parameter.  Note that the need for incentives to invest in research becomes small as 8
grows large because the probability of innovation can be made high at low cost as 8 grows large:
for any k > 0, p(k8) 6 G p as 8 6  4, where G p = lim p(k) as k 6  4.  And indeed, inspection of (11)27It is clear that as 8 6  4, k(E(s*)) and k(B(t)) both approach 0, and p(k(E(s*))) and p(k(B(t)) both approach G p. 
Hence, the integrand in (11) approaches G p l(t) > 0.
28The government will need the same information to compute the optimal reward under the optional reward
system, and to make comparisons between that system and the other systems.
16
shows that reward will be superior to patent if 8 is sufficiently high.
27 
Additionally, we observe that the information the government needs to make the
comparison between patent and reward is not only the density g(t), the demand curves d(q;t), and
the production cost c, but also the probability function p(k).
28
E.  Optional Reward Regime
Under the optional reward regime, the innovator can choose whether to take the
government reward r (in which case the innovation information is placed in the public domain) or
instead to obtain a patent.  Hence, the innovator will choose the reward if and only if r $ B(t); he
will choose patent when the demand curve is such that monopoly profits would be high, as is
illustrated in Figure 2.  Note that if r < B(ta), then the innovator will always behave the same way
— choose patent and obtain B(t) —  so that in determining the optimal reward, we can restrict
attention to r $ B(ta).   Now let t(r) denote B
-1(r) for r in [B(ta), B(tb)] and let t(r) = tb for r > B(tb). 
Then social welfare under the optional reward system is
                   t(r)                       tb
 WO(r) =     I[p(k(r))s*(t) - k(r)]g(t)dt +  I[p(k(B(t)))(s*(t) - l(t)) - k(B(t))]g(t)dt. (12)
        ta                      t(r)
The derivative of (12) is 
WON(r) = kN(r)[pN(k(r))E(s**t # t(r)) - 1]G(t(r)) + tN(r)p(k(r))l(t(r))g(t(r)), (13)
where G is the cumulative distribution function of g and E(s**t # t(r)) is the expected value of
s*(t) conditional on t # t(r).  The first term in (13) reflects the inframarginal effect of raising the17
reward: the influence of the increase in research investment in cases where the innovator chooses
the reward.  Note that the term in brackets, [pN(k(r))E(s**t # t(r)) - 1], is the expected net return
from more investment in such cases.  The second term in (13) is the marginal effect of raising the
reward: just inducing the innovator to accept the reward rather than to obtain a patent.  In this
circumstance, the innovator, by accepting the reward, does not alter his research investment (since
the reward just equals his monopoly profits); the only change is that the monopoly pricing
deadweight loss l(t(r)) is eliminated, explaining that factor in the second term.
Now the second term in (13) is non-negative (it is clear that tN(r) is non-negative).  Hence,
if the first term in (13) is positive, (13) will be positive.  The first term will be positive if
[pN(k(r))E(s**t # t(r)) - 1] is positive, and that will be so if and only if r < E(s**t # t(r)).  This in
turn certainly will be true for r # s*(ta), because s*(ta) <  E(s**t # t(r)) for any r.  Thus (13) must
be positive for r # s*(ta), which implies that the optimal r, denoted r**, must exceed s*(ta).  We
therefore have
  PROPOSITION 4: Under the optional reward system, the innovator chooses the reward
when monopoly profit would be lower; otherwise he chooses patent.  The optimal optional
reward, r**, exceeds the minimum social surplus, s*(ta).
We observe that if r** $ B(tb), then the optional reward will always be chosen, so the
outcome is equivalent to that if r** were a mandatory reward. 
F.  Optional Reward versus Patent
We can immediately show the following.
PROPOSITION 5:  The optional reward system is superior to the patent system.
This result is really a corollary of Proposition 4.  In particular, as we observed, the patent18
system is equivalent to an optional reward system with r =  B(ta), because then the patent would
always be chosen.  But since r** > s*(ta), we know that r** exceeds B(ta); hence, the optimal
optional reward system must be superior to the patent system.
Although the above paragraph demonstrates the result, it is perhaps best understood by
considering why the optional reward system with a reward of s*(ta) is superior to patent (and a
fortiori why the optional reward system with the optimal reward must be superior to patent).  If
the reward is s*(ta), the reward will be chosen by the innovator whenever monopoly profits are
less than this amount, that is, the reward will be chosen when t is in the interval 
[ta, t(s*(ta))); see Figure 2.   For any t in this interval, it is apparent that the choice of reward over
patent must increase social welfare: the deadweight loss due to monopoly is eliminated; and since
the innovator chooses research investment of k(s*(ta)) instead of k(B(t)), and k(B(t)) <  k(s*(ta))
< k(s*(t)), the increase in research investment also raises social welfare.  Because, then, social
welfare is higher under optional reward whenever the reward is chosen and is the same as under
patent when the reward is not chosen, social welfare must have risen. 
G.  Optional Reward versus Reward
We have yet to compare the optional reward system to the reward system, which is of a
mandatory nature.  We have 
PROPOSITION 6:  Either the optional reward system or the reward system may be superior
to the other.
That the optional reward system may be superior to reward is clear: the patent system may
be superior to reward, according to Proposition 3; and whenever the patent system is superior to
reward, the optional reward system must be superior to reward, for optional reward is superior to29It is also possible for optional reward to be superior to reward when reward is superior to patent.
30We have constructed a numerical example in which reward may be superior to optimal reward; see the
Appendix.
31A factor from which we abstract is that an innovator might have an incentive to make substantial purchases,
because the optimal reward per unit might exceed marginal production cost.  For example, the reward for each pill sold of a
new drug might exceed its production cost, in which case the innovating company would have an incentive to make large
purchases of its pill.  Such manipulation of quantity sold would have to be policed by government in a quantity-based
reward regime.
19
patent, according to Proposition 5.
29   The explanation is essentially that under optional reward,
when the demand curve is high, patent will be chosen and incentives to invest will thus not be
dulled by a too-low-under-the-circumstances reward.  This investment-incentive advantage of
optional reward may be more important than the disadvantage of deadweight loss from patent
monopoly-pricing.
That the reward system may be superior to optional reward is possible for related reasons. 
When the demand curve is high and patent is chosen under optional reward, the investment-
incentive advantage of optional reward may be less important than the disadvantage of
deadweight loss from patent monopoly-pricing.  Reward, being mandatory, prevents the potential
problem that patent would be chosen when the demand curve is high.
30  
H.  Rewards Conditional on Quantity Sold
Suppose now that government can observe quantity q sold and base rewards on this.  Our
analysis would then be modified in straightforward ways.  In Section IIC, the reward would not
be a constant but a function r(q).  The innovator would then choose k(r(q(t))): the innovator
knows t, so can calculate what the equilibrium quantity sold q(t) would be, and thus the reward
r(q(t)) he would receive.  (Note that the innovator does not influence q(t), as he is one seller in a
competitive market.
31)  Hence, social welfare (10) given the function r(q) would become20
                 tb
 WR(r(q))   =    I[p(k(r(q(t)))s*(t) - k(r(q(t)))]g(t)dt
             ta
               qb
                 =    I[p(k(r(q)))E(s**q) - k(r(q))]f(q)dq, (10')
            qa
where E(s**q) is the mean of s*(t) given that q(t) = q, f(q) is the density of q derived from g(t)
(that is, f(q) is the density of the set of t such that q(t) = q), and qi = q(ti).  It is evident from (10')
that, for any q, the socially optimal r(q) is E(s**q); the optimal reward function is the mean social
surplus conditional on the demand curve being such that the quantity sold at price c was the
observed quantity.
Clearly, the comparison between reward schemes and the patent system would be
qualitatively unchanged from that discussed above.  However, because the quantity-based optimal
reward is generally different from the unconditional optimal reward (because E(s**q) is generally
different from E(s*)) and thus is superior to it, the quantity-based reward would more often be
superior to patent than the unconditional reward is superior to patent.  Likewise, the quantity-
based optional reward would be superior to the unconditional optional reward, and would thus be
more advantageous relative to the patent system than would the unconditional optional reward.
III.  Discussion
We comment here on a number of issues that were omitted from the model and on its
interpretation.
An alternative system: patent and reward.  A policy that we did not consider is one in
which an innovator always obtains a patent and is also given a reward.  This system is superior to
patent, since the problem of underinvestment is alleviated by payment of a reward.  (The optimal21
reward would equal the expected value of the difference between social surplus and monopoly
profits at the monopoly quantity — the social surplus not captured by the patent holder.)  The
system might or might not be superior to reward or optional reward, for reasons analogous to
those relating to the comparison between patent and reward.
Government’s ability to obtain information about the value of innovations.  As we
stressed in the analysis, government’s knowledge about the social value of innovations, embodied
in its probability distribution over demand curves, is important to the performance of the reward
system and to that of the optional reward system (even though the latter dominates patent no
matter how poor government’s knowledge).  In fact, one supposes that the government could
obtain significant information about demand.  Most obviously, the government can base its
rewards on sales data, which should be relatively easy to obtain; thus, the version of rewards
discussed in Section IIH is the most relevant one to consider.  (Note that if rewards are based on
sales, the government should not fear that it would be flooded by claimants for rewards with
inferior or meaningless innovations — they would not generate products that would pass the
market test.)  The government could also attempt to measure more about the demand curve than
sales at the market price; it could estimate demand elasticities, undertake surveys to determine the
character and frequency of use of, for example, computer software, musical recordings, cinematic
and television productions.  As events unfold and information flows to the government, it could
appropriately supplement rewards, perhaps on an annual basis.  In past proposals for reward
systems, payments based on sales and other information that government receives have sometimes
been discussed (see especially Polanvyi (1943 pp. 67-69)).   It would be a gross mistake to
envision the reward as having to be premised on the government’s estimate of valuation at the32To amplify, let the innovator’s ex ante information be z, which can be written z(q), because the assumption is
that q is at least as informative as z.  Then it is clear that a social optimum given the constraint that the innovator knows
only z when he chooses k can be achieved under the reward system if the reward equals E(s**q), whereas under the patent
system, k will be suboptimal and the amount sold will be too low.
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time an innovation is registered. 
Government’s information versus innovators’.  We have just mentioned the ability of
government to obtain information about demand, but we have not considered how good
innovators’ information is and its relation to government’s.  In this regard, two comments should
be made, which together suggest that the factor of innovators’ superiority of information may be
less important than it initially appears to be.  First, innovators’ information will often be
substantially imperfect ex ante, at the time when they are deciding on research investment — the
crucial period for assessment of innovators’ information.  Second, government’s information will
often be reasonably good ex post, which is the pertinent period for assessment of government
information when rewards are based on sales-related evaluations of worth.  Thus, when rewards
are based on ex post data, the informational comparison that bears on the choice between
rewards and intellectual property rights is that between innovators’ ex ante information and
government’s ex post information (that innovators’ ex ante information may be superior to
government’s ex ante information would be irrelevant to the choice between rewards and property
rights).  This point can be put more sharply.  Suppose, as is not implausible, that government’s ex
post, sales-related information about demand is as good as innovators’ ex ante information, when
they are deciding on research investment.  Then innovators enjoy no informational advantage that
favors intellectual property rights, and mandatory rewards (not just optional rewards) are
unambiguously superior to intellectual property rights.
3233See Chapter 10 of Tirole (1988).
34To some degree, this problem can be addressed by legal rules that force the right holder to allow an innovator to
make and sell an improved product; this is what compulsory licensing rules of patent law do.
35See Scherer (1980 p. 452).
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Race to be first.  The optimal magnitude of the reward would be affected in practice by a
consideration that we did not study in our model: the race among potential innovators to be the
first to innovate.  As is emphasized in the literature on patent, this race leads to the possibility of
overinvestment in research because the private return to being first may exceed its social value.
33 
Likewise, under a reward system, there would be a race to be first, and it might lead to excessive
investment in research, lowering the optimal reward.  Because the race to be first is a factor that
afflicts both systems, and because the information needed to address it under either seems to be of
the same character, consideration of the race to be first does not seem to bear on the comparison
between reward and patent.
Subsequent innovations. We did not discuss the issue of subsequent innovations, that is,
improvements to innovations or new innovations depending on past ones.  In this regard, two
points are of interest.  First, under the intellectual property rights system, subsequent innovations
may be stymied by refusal of holders of property rights to allow improvements; there may be
breakdowns in bargaining between the holders and innovators.
34  A famous example of this
occurred when James Watt, holder of an early steam engine patent, denied licenses to improve it
to Jonathan Hornblower and Richard Trevithick, who had to wait for Watt’s patent to expire in
1800 before they could develop their high-pressure engine.
35   Under a reward system, this would
not have been the case, for Watt’s steam engine would have been in the public domain, and
Hornblower and Trevithick would have been free to improve it immediately.  (Indeed, as noted in36See, for example, Macfie (1875 p. 5) who states, “when an invention is patented, the reward being monopoly, a
stop is put to improvement....If we substituted for monopoly a sensible system of grants in money, thus preserving a
pecuniary stimulus to publish inventions, I predict that almost every new machine or process would be studied, scrutinized,
and subjected to such an amount of diversified and intelligent thought that...it would be greatly perfectionated.”
37In considering this paragraph, the complicating factor that administrative costs are really endogenous should be
borne in mind.  We can imagine an intellectual property rights system that is less expensive than the one we have, and we
can imagine a reward system that involves low administrative costs because it bases rewards on a simple formula, such as
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the Introduction, this was one of the arguments in favor of the reward system emphasized in the
19
th century debates.
36)  The second point of note is that government’s problem of determining
rewards is made more difficult when the value of an innovation is in part that it leads to
subsequent innovations.  However, government’s problem in administering the patent system is
also made more difficult by the possibility of subsequent innovations (notably, in determining
issues of patent scope — which subsequent innovations will be considered infringing), and for
closely-related informational reasons.  Hence, it is not clear the extent to which, or whether, the
added informational difficulty presented by subsequent innovations favors patent over reward.
Administrative costs.  Under a reward system, administrative costs would be incurred by
the government in deciding upon rewards, and there would be litigation about rewards between
innovators and government, as well as between innovators who contest each other’s rewards. 
However, there would also be a savings in administrative costs relative to the patent or copyright
systems: under these systems, intellectual property rights have to be protected by the state, parties
often make efforts to determine if their rights have been violated and also to ascertain if they are
violating someone’s else’s rights, and litigation costs are incurred in disputes over rights; but
under the reward system, there are no intellectual property rights to generate such costs.  On a
priori grounds, one cannot say whether the administrative cost savings of the reward system
would outweigh the administrative costs that the reward system would entail.
37a percentage of sales revenues. 
38The point that income taxes are superior to commodity taxes is presented, for example, in Stiglitz (1987).  See
also Kaplow (1996), who emphasizes that there need not be any distortionary cost associated with raising greater income
tax revenues to finance a government program if the income tax is optimally adjusted rather than mechanically increased.
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Tax-financing cost of a reward system.  Reward systems have to be financed, and we
presume through income taxation, but that involves a labor-supply-related distortionary cost,
something that was not considered in our model.  Hence, the potential case for reward is less
strong than is suggested by our analysis.  However, there are reasons to believe that financing
innovation through income taxation involves lower distortionary cost than financing innovation
through the grant of intellectual property rights.  In particular, we know from the tax literature
that raising funds through income taxation is superior to doing so through commodity taxation
(which is essentially equivalent to granting intellectual property rights); this conclusion presumes
that the income tax can be adjusted in an optimal way to raise funds.
38  If one takes the view that
the income tax cannot be optimally adjusted, then there is still some basis for believing that the
income tax involves less distortion than intellectual property rights: income taxation is equivalent
to a uniform tax on all goods, whereas intellectual property rights involves concentrated taxes in
the form of monopoly prices on just a subset of goods; and raising a given amount through a
uniform tax on all goods generally involves less deadweight loss than through a tax on a subset of
goods. 
Further merits of the optional reward system. The optional reward system not only has
the theoretical advantage that it is superior to intellectual property rights, it has the practical,
political advantage that industry should not object to it, as it can only raise firms’ profits. 
Moreover, the fear that government would act suboptimally, and give unduly conservative26
rewards, would be less an issue under an optional reward scheme because innovators can always
obtain intellectual property rights.  Indeed, just because of innovators’ option, the government’s
temptation to pay too little might be checked under an optional reward system.  Thus, were there
an interest in actual adoption of a reward scheme, an optional version might be the best type to
propose initially.  (As noted earlier, the plan set out by Polanvyi (1943) was mainly optional in
nature, as are schemes for the government to offer to purchase patents.) 
Importance of the advantages of reward systems.  To appreciate the possible advantages
of reward systems, it is helpful to consider areas of innovation where the social losses due to
intellectual property rights are likely to be high, namely, where the difference between price and
production cost (after innovation) is large.  Such areas of innovation may be exemplified by
development of pharmaceuticals, computer software, and recorded music and visual products.
Here, prices are often substantial in relation to production cost; drugs may sell for many times
their marginal production cost,  the price of computer software is generally nontrivial even though
its marginal production cost is essentially zero (it can be downloaded from the Internet), and
similar statements can be made about CD recordings, cable TV broadcasts, and first-run movies.  
In a regime with rewards, drugs would be far cheaper and more widely used, all computer
software would be free, and electronically recorded materials would be inexpensive, arguably
engendering significant increases in consumer welfare.  Moreover, there would also be potential
gains from enhanced incentives to innovate, as profits from patent and copyright may fall far short
of consumer surplus.  For example, Kremer (1997) suggests that studies of the social versus the
private returns from research indicate that private profits from research might well be less than
one third of the social returns.  Because optimal rewards would reflect the social returns, rewards27
would increase overall incentives to invest.
4. Conclusion
Reward systems, or optional reward systems, and especially those based on sales-related
information, appear on reflection to hold great promise as alternatives to our system of intellectual
property rights, because there is no necessity to marry the incentive to innovate to conferral of
monopoly power in innovations.  As such, serious study of the possibility of reward systems, with
a view towards their implementation at least on an experimental, partial basis, is worth
contemplating.28
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Appendix: Numerical Example
We describe here a numerical example that illustrates the model analyzed.  Let p(k) =
(exp[.1k] - 1)/exp[.1k] and c = 5.  Suppose that demand curves are kinked (for computational
convenience) and given by d(q;t) = min (.5t - .05q +5, 200t - 20q - 1800), so that the kink occurs
at q = 10t - 90.476.  The parameter t is in [ta, tb] = [10, 20] and is distributed according to the
truncated normal distribution with mean 15 and variance 4.  That is g(t) = (1/(8B)
1/2)exp[-(t -
15)
2/8] + .0012419.  The following can be verified:
(i) First-best surplus s*(t) = 2.5t
2 - 204.139,  k(s*(t)) = 10ln[.1s*(t)], B(t) = 45.238t -
409.3, l(t) = .51076, and k(B(t)) = 10ln[.1B(t)].  
(ii) The optimal reward r* = E(s*) = 367.62, and k(E(s*)) = 10ln[36.762].
(iii) Reward is superior to patent: social welfare under reward is 321.57 and under patent
it is 321.51.  However, if the distribution of t is modified from the truncated normal to the
uniform distribution in [10, 20], then patent is superior to reward: social welfare under reward is
332.84 and under patent it is 334.04.
(iv) The optimal optional reward r** =  327.2, and this exceeds s*(ta) =  45.35.  The
optional reward is superior to patent: social welfare under the optimal optional reward is 321.62,
whereas social welfare under the patent system is 321.51.
(v) The optional reward is superior to reward: social welfare under the optional reward is
321.62, whereas social welfare under the reward system is 321.57.   However, we can modify the
distribution of t to illustrate that reward may be superior to optimal reward.  Let t be uniformly
distributed at height 9 over the subinterval [14.95, 15.05] and uniformly distributed at height 131
over the subinterval [17.9, 18].  Then reward is superior to optional reward: under reward, social
welfare is 336.218, and under optimal optional reward, social welfare is 336.214.  (The reason
that reward is superior may be explained roughly by two observations: reward functions well
because 90% of the probability mass is in a concentrated region, about 15; reward is superior to
patent even for t  in the high region, [17.9, 18], due to the deadweight loss from monopoly
pricing, but patent is chosen in that region under optimal optional reward.)